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Abstract
The presence of costly cooperation between otherwise selfish actors is not trivial. A prominent mechanism that promotes
cooperation is spatial population structure. However, recent experiments with human subjects report substantially lower
level of cooperation then predicted by theoretical models. We analyze the data of such an experiment in which a total of
400 players play a Prisoner’s Dilemma on a 4|4 square lattice in two treatments, either interacting via a fixed square lattice
(15 independent groups) or with a population structure changing after each interaction (10 independent groups). We
analyze the statistics of individual decisions and infer in which way they can be matched with the typical models of
evolutionary game theorists. We find no difference in the strategy updating between the two treatments. However, the
strategy updates are distinct from the most popular models which lead to the promotion of cooperation as shown by
computer simulations of the strategy updating. This suggests that the promotion of cooperation by population structure is
not as straightforward in humans as often envisioned in theoretical models.
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Introduction
Why would a self-interested individual pay towards the welfare
of someone else? The evolution of cooperation is a fascinating
problem originating in evolutionary biology [1–3] which has
extended to several other disciplines subsequently [4–7]. While the
evolution of cooperation requires an explanation, several mech-
anisms have been proposed that are routinely invoked to explain it
[8,9]. One of them which is particularly popular among theorists is
spatial population structure. Regular lattices lead to interesting
effects and dependences on details of the underlying evolutionary
model [10–20]. The exploration of non-regular population
structures, such as scale-free networks, suggest an intricate
dependence on details of the population structure and update
mechanisms [18,21–26]. Even more complex effects arise when
the underlying population structure is dynamic [27–32].
The promotion of cooperation based on population structure
has been analyzed extensively by an enormous number of
mathematical and computational models. Many theoretical papers
suggest a direct applicability to human behavior. But until now,
only few experiments to test these predictions have been
performed, as discussed in [33]. Such behavioral experiments
have been performed on one-dimensional lattices [34], two
dimensional lattices [35–37], and complex networks [37–39].
These studies have tested the predictions of theoretical models, i.e.
the level of cooperation induced by population structure, and also
the underlying assumption of update mechanisms.
So far, there is little evidence that the sophisticated theoretical
results of cooperation in structured populations can be carried
over directly to human behavior. One important question from
the perspective of a theoretician is whether human subjects
condition their decision making on the population structure, i.e.
whether they use consistent strategy updating in spatial and non-
spatial experiments. Here, we analyze the data of such a
behavioral experiment with a two-dimensional lattice and fully
independent controls to address this issue [35]. Previously, this
data has only been used to infer the strategy updating in the spatial
system, but no systematic comparison between the treatments has
been provided. We find no significant difference between the
spatial and the non-spatial treatment in strategy updating, which
suggests that the subjects did not adapt their behavior to the
population structure. However, the way that strategies are updated
is different from the update rules usually used in theoretical models
that promote the evolution of cooperation.
Results
Experimental setup
The classical Prisoner’s Dilemma is played between two players,
each of them can choose to cooperate (C) or to defect (D). The
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payoff matrix is given by
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where the shown payoffs are for the row player. Here, T stands for
the temptation to defect, R for the reward for mutual cooperation,
P for the punishment for mutual defection and S for the sucker’s
payoff. A Prisoner’s Dilemma is defined by the inequation
TwRwPwS. In other words, while mutual cooperation leads
to a higher payoff than mutual defection, it is worthwhile to defect
against a cooperator (TwR) and to defect against a defector
(PwS), In addition to this payoff ranking, the condition
2RwTzS should be added in repeated games. In the experiment
we have analyzed, the payoffs were chosen as T~0:40 J,
R~0:30 J, P~0:10 J and S~0:00 J.
In the vast majority of spatially extended models, players make
only a single decision in each round which determines their action
against all their neighbors. The same holds for our experiment.
Participants of the spatial treatment discussed here were virtually
located on the nodes of a 4|4 square lattice with periodic
boundary conditions, as if the players would be located on the
torus. They play a PD game with each of the four neighbors in
their von Neumann neighborhood (the four cells orthogonally
surrounding a central cell on the lattice). Players must choose one
strategy which determines their action in all four games with their
four neighbors. The payoffs are calculated by adding the four
payoffs of individual games with each neighbor. There are no self-
interactions. After each round, players were informed about their
action and payoff as well as the actions and payoffs of their four
neighbors. Based on this information and their experience from
previous interactions, they had to decide on their next action.
The experiment had 25 sessions separated in two different
treatments. In the spatial treatment the players had fixed
neighbors, which stayed the same throughout the whole game.
This treatment was repeated 15 times, each with 16 players and 25
rounds. In the non spatial control treatment (repeated 10 times
with 16 players and 25 rounds), the neighbors were assigned to a
new, random location on the lattice after each round and
consequently, the neighbors of each player changed in each
round. Players were not informed about the number of rounds. In
both treatments, players are informed about the outcomes of every
round, about the actions and payoffs of the neighbors they played
with. However, at the moment they need to make a decision about
their next action, they are not informed about the previous actions
or payoff of their new neighbors. In contrast it was easy to
remember the previous actions of the neighbors in the spatial
setting.
General observables in the two treatments
Let us compare the general outcomes of the spatial and non-
spatial treatments.
We find no significant differences in the fraction of cooperative
actions between the two treatments. Figure 1 illustrates that the
errors bars of the treatments are overlapping to the great extend,
which suggests that there are no large differences between the
treatments. This can be backed up by several statistical tests. First,
we fit the difference between the two treatments with a linear
function. We find an intercept of 0:001+0:017 and a slope
0:001128+0:001153. Since both values are smaller than their
errors, it suggests that the values are close to zero. Second, we
constructed a nonlinear regression model with a dummy variable
for the spatial and the non spatial treatments. In this model, the
fraction of cooperative actions C(t) in round t is given by
C(t)~(C(1)zsDC(1))(CzsDC)t{1 ð2Þ
Here, the parameters of the model are C(1), measuring the
fraction of cooperative actions in the first round of the non spatial
treatment, DC(1), measuring the difference in cooperative actions
in the first round between the two treatments, C, measuring the
decay on cooperative actions in the non spatial treatment, and DC,
measuring the difference in this decay between the two treatments.
In addition, we introduced the dummy variable s, which equals 0
for the non spatial treatment and 1 for the spatial treatment. From
the nonlinear regression model, we find C(1)~0:49 (pv10{3)
and C~0:94 (pv10{3). The p-values show that these numbers
are significantly different from zero. For the differences, we obtain
p~0:75 for DC(1) and p~0:33 for DC, showing that the
dependence on the dummy variable is not statistically significant.
All this indicates that the difference between two treatments is not
significant.
Next, we address the distribution of cooperative acts per player,
the distribution of cumulative payoff per player, and the
correlation between the two. Figure 1 illustrates that these two
distributions are very similar in the two treatments. To compare
the distributions between the treatments quantitatively, we
performed a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. We found p~0:69 for
the comparison of the two distributions of cooperative acts and
p~0:13 for the comparison of the two distributions of cumulative
payoffs. These p-values indicate that we cannot accept the
hypothesis that the two distributions arising from the two
treatments are different. In order to compare the correlation
between the cumulative payoffs and the number of cooperative
acts, we developed a linear regression model,
E(NC)~E0zsDE0zrNCzsDrNC , ð3Þ
where E is the cumulative payoff, NC is the number of cooperative
acts, E0 is the intercept for the non spatial treatment and DE0 the
difference between the intercepts of the two treatments. The slope
in the non spatial treatment is measured by r and Dr measures the
difference of the slope between the two treatments. Again, s is a
dummy variable which is equal to 0 for the non spatial treatment
and 1 for the spatial treatment. We obtained E0~16:9+0:3
(pv10{3), r~{0:30+0:05 (pv10{3), DE0~0:9+0:5
(p~0:022), and Dr~{0:7+0:6 (p~0:17). The large p values
for DE0 and Dr show that there is no significant difference
between the two treatments.
In the next section, we depart from the level of aggregate
information on the system level and address the individual
decisions of our players in more detail. Many theoretical models
have shown that this kind of update mechanism can have a
profound impact on the outcome in such models [16,17,23,26].
Update mechanisms
In order to understand the dynamics of the system in more
detail, we fitted three different update mechanisms that are
popular in theoretical studies to the data of the experiment
(i) Unconditional imitation, where each players switches to the
strategy that performed best in the past in the neighborhood.
In addition, we assume that some decisions are made at
random and that this fraction changes over time.
Experimental Spatial Games
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(ii) Fermi rule - where strategies with higher payoffs are
imitated with higher probability. In addition, sometimes a
random strategy is chosen.
(iii) Moody conditional cooperation - Cooperation conditioned
upon the own action in the previous round and the number
of cooperators in the neighborhood.
In the classical studies on the promotion of cooperation on
lattices, unconditional imitation has been assumed [10,12,40]. In
this case, players update their strategies by imitating the previous
action of the neighbor with the highest payoff. In Figure 2, we
illustrate how often the players action is the same as the action of
the highest scoring neighbor in the previous round. The
probability of this inferred imitation is around 75% and is growing
during the game. However, before we conclude that the
unconditional imitation is the update mechanism players use
frequently, we should notice that defection is almost always the
most successful strategy in the neighborhood. Therefore, if a
player defects it seems that she/he is imitating the best neighbor.
Consequently, the level of defection is very similar to the level of
inferred imitation (Figure 2). To further test the hypotheses of
unconditional imitation we performed a randomization test [41].
In this test, the action of the players is kept, but the neighborhood
is randomized. This gives a reference model for imitation, because
with randomized neighborhoods there can be no imitation. We
repeated the randomization 10 000 times to compute the
distribution of probabilities of inferred imitation from a random
setting. The results are presented in the insets of Figure 2. We see
that distributions are very narrow and that the value from the
experiment is slightly higher than the randomized average. The p-
value is p~0:001 for the spatial treatment and p~0:028 for the
non spatial treatment, indicating that the small difference between
the observed imitation and the randomized one is significant. This
is different from the result of the same analysis in [36], where the
small difference is not significant. However there are several
differences between the two experiment which could be respon-
sible for this disagreement, such as sample size, system size,
number of neighbors, payoff matrix etc. Importantly, in both
experiment the level of imitation was lower then 80%. Thus,
players sometimes use strategies not played in their neighborhood
before, which is very likely to prevent the cluster formation in both
cases equally.
Figure 1. Comparison of the spatial and non-spatial treatments. (a) The fraction of players that have chosen to cooperate is decreasing over
time, but remains substantial throughout the experiment [35]. The error bars are the standard deviations of a binomial distribution,
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
C(1{C)=n)
p
,
where n is the number of samples and C is the fraction of cooperation. (b) The distribution of cooperative acts per player. We do not observe
unconditional cooperation, and very little unconditional defection (5 out of 240 players in the spatial treatment and 6 out of 160 players in the non
spatial treatment). (c) The distributions of cumulative payoffs are peaked with median of 15.4 J for the spatial and 15.0 J for the non spatial
treatment. The standard deviation is 2.3 J in both cases. (d) Correlation between the frequency of cooperation on the x-axis and the cumulative
payoff on the y-axis. Each point is one player.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0047718.g001
Experimental Spatial Games
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The second mechanism we tested is typically referred to as
Fermi rule [11,14,42]. For this rule, the better the neighbor
performs the higher is the possibility that he/she will be imitated,
see Fig. 3. Here, b measures the intensity of selection, for b?0
imitation is random and for b??, we recover the unconditional
imitation from above. Note that this is slightly different from the
original Fermi update mechanism, which would be difficult to
check. In the original mechanism a random player is chosen and
then imitated with the probability given above. However, the
additional randomness would make it difficult to analyze the
original rule in the experimental data, because in two identical
situations, two players could chose a different payoff difference as
the basis for comparison. Therefore we measure the probability of
imitating the most successful neighbor who played the opposite
strategy instead. This test corresponds to a rule where instead of
the random player, the best player of the opposite action is chosen
and imitated with the same probability as in the original rule.
However the rule conserves a very important property of the
original rule, which is to allow strategy changes even when the
payoff difference is negative, since the best performing player of
the opposite strategy can still have a payoff smaller than the focal
player. To analyze this dependence, we again fitted the data to a
Figure 2. Unconditional imitation test in the spatial treatment (left) and in the non spatial treatment (right). The main panels show
three different type of data: the fraction of inferred imitations, the level of defection and fraction of decisions in which defection was the best
performing strategy in the neighborhood. The inferred level of imitation is the fraction of actions in which the players action coincided with the
action of the best neighbor in the previous round. Since defection is almost always the best performing strategy, a defecting player seems to be
imitating. Therefore, the level of defection is almost identical to the level of the inferred imitations. However, the randomization test illustrated in the
inset shows that there is still more imitation than expected in a random setting. The vertical lines show the inferred imitation observed in the
experiments, plus and minus a standard deviation, and the gray bars show the distribution of the inferred imitation in the randomized sample.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0047718.g002
Figure 3. Probability of imitating depending on the payoff difference. Left: probability of switching to another strategy depending on the
payoff differences for both the spatial and non spatial experiment. The payoff difference is between the focal player and the best player of the
opposite strategy. The results are consistent with imitating the neighbors with higher payoffs. However this imitation is not unconditional, but the
higher the payoff difference the larger is the probability of imitation. In addition, players might spontaneously switch their strategies even if they
have no neighbors playing the other strategy, resembling mutations. Error bars are the standard deviations of a binomial distribution,ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
PC<D(1{PC<D)=n)
p
, where n is the number of samples and PC<D is the probability of changing the action). Right: Probability of mutations in
time. Mutations are defined as the probability that a cooperator surrounded by four cooperators would change the strategy in the next round or that
a defector surrounded by four defectors will change the strategy in the next round. We see a large number of mutations, which decreases over time,
but always stay substantial. Again in both treatments the players show a similar pattern of behavior. Error bars are the standard deviations of a
binomial distribution,
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
M(1{M)=n)
p
, where n is the number of samples and M is the probability of mutation).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0047718.g003
Experimental Spatial Games
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logistic regression model,
PC<D(Dp)~
1
1ze{(azsDazbDpzsDbDp)
: ð4Þ
Here, a measures the probability to switch strategy in the case of
zero payoff differences and Da measures the difference between
this quantity in the two treatments. The parameter b measures the
intensity of selection and Db is the difference in the intensity of
selection between the treatments. As above, s is a dummy variable
with s~0 for the non spatial and s~1 for the spatial treatment.
The p-values for Da and Db are 0:7 and 0:6, respectively, such that
the dependence on the treatment is not significant.
However, the players will switch their strategies even if they are
surrounded by players with the same strategy as theirs. This
corresponds to mutations or exploration behavior [43]. This
exploration behavior decreases over time in a manner comparable
with the decrease of global cooperation level (Figure 3). To analyze
the difference between the spatial and non spatial treatment, we
utilize a non linear regression model,
M(t)~(mzsDm)(CzsDC)t{1 ð5Þ
where, M(t) is the fraction of exploration behavior in round t. The
initial level of exploration is measured by m and Dm, its decay is
measured by C and DC. The p-values for the parameters Dm and
DC are both 0:48. Thus, the dependence on the treatment is
statistically not significant.
The last update mechanism we analyzed is conditional behavior
based on the own previous action and the number of cooperators
in the neighborhood. In [36], this has been termed ‘‘moody
conditional cooperation’’. In Figure 4, we show the probability of
cooperating depending on the number of neighbors who
cooperated in the previous round and the action of the focal
players in the previous round. In the case that the focal player
cooperated in the previous round, the probability of her/him
cooperating increases linearly with the number of cooperating
neighbors, as in previous work. On the other hand, if the player
defected in the previous round, the probability of him/her
cooperating decreases linearly with the number of cooperating
neighbors. We developed a linear regression model with two
dummy variables,
PC(l)~c0lzc1lzc2szc3llzc4slzc5ls ð6Þ
where PC(l) is probability of cooperation after l of your neighbors
cooperated in the previous round. The ci are the parameters of the
model, in a similar manner as described above. Again, s is a
dummy variable which is equal to 0 for the non spatial treatment
and 1 for the spatial one. The second dummy variable l is equal to
1 if the focal player cooperated himself/herself in the previous
round and 0 otherwise. P(l) depends significantly only on c0 and
c3 (p-valuesv10{4). Therefore, the probability of cooperation
does not depend on the treatment. It does not depend either on
the number of cooperators in the previous round if we do not
control for the players own action.
Simulations
In the experiments, there is no hint for a significant difference
between the treatments. In order to understand why this happens,
we have performed simulations with the three update mechanisms
fitted to the experimental data: unconditional imitation (with
random strategy exploration), Fermi rule (also with random
strategy exploration) and moody conditional cooperation. We
found that these three update mechanisms will not promote
cooperation on lattices and that for them spatial structure does not
make a difference, even for much larger systems. Unconditional
imitation with random strategy exploration obeys the equation
Figure 4. Probability of cooperation depending on the previous action and the number of cooperators in the neighborhood. These
are called moody conditional cooperators in [36]. We see that there is a clear difference between the behavior after cooperating and defecting. After
cooperating, the probability of cooperating increases with the number of cooperating neighbors and after defecting the probability of cooperation is
decreasing with the number of cooperating neighbors. Again, in both the spatial and the non spatial setting the behavior is very similar.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0047718.g004
Experimental Spatial Games
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PA?B(Dp)~mC
t{1z(1{2mCt{1)H(Dp) ð7Þ
where PA?B is the probability that a player with action A will
change his action to the action of the player B, who is her/his best
performing neighbor. The round of the game is t, Dp~pB{pA,
where pA is the payoff of an A player and pB is the payoff of his
best performing neighbor playing B. H(x) is the Heaviside
function, which is one for positive arguments and zero otherwise.
From the experimental data, we found m~0:380+0:013 and
C~0:962+0:003. For the simulations with imitation only we set
the random strategy exploration parameter m~0. In the first
round, C is played with probability 70% and in the every other
round the probability of imitation the best player is determined
according to the probability given by Eq.7.
If the player does not imitate she/he will play C or D with equal
probability. We see that the simulations with mw0 reproduce the
cooperation level well, but as we saw before, the best performing
neighbor will almost always be a defector. Therefore the above
update mechanism is equivalent to the mechanism where the next
action is determined only by the term mCt{1 in Eq. 7. Promotion
of cooperation can only occur through the formation of clusters of
cooperators, which is prevented by the random strategy explora-
tion. Therefore, since clusters of cooperators cannot be formed
anyway, both spatial and non spatial treatments show low levels of
cooperation driven by mw0 only. On the other hand, for m~0, the
two simulation setups display very different dynamics. In the
spatial setting, the level of cooperation drops at the beginning,
until clusters start forming and expand in a sufficiently large
system. In the non spatial setting, such clusters cannot form and
the cooperation level drops to zero.
In the Fermi update rule, the probability of switching to the
opposite strategy depends on the difference of the payoffs between
the focal player its neighbors. The dependence is given by the
Fermi function, see above. While conventionally a random
neighbor is chosen for comparison, in the analysis of the
experimental data we have focused on the neighbor with the
opposite strategy and the highest payoff. In our simulations, we
take the same approach. If there are no players with the opposite
strategy in the neighborhood, players will still switch their strategy
with some probability. We call this mutations or exploration
behavior. In contrast to [35], we here assume that this quantity is
time dependent. In the right panel of Figure 3, we present the
probability of mutations over time. Summarizing this approach we
find for the probability of changing strategy
PC<D(Dp)~mC
t{1z(1{2mCt{1)
1
1ze{bDpza
: ð8Þ
Note that for b??, we recover the unconditional imitation from
above. For the simulations, we used the parameters obtained from
fitting to the experiment, b~0:15+0:01, a~0:45+0:07,
m~0:45+0:05, C~0:954+0:007 for the spatial treatment and
b~0:17+0:02, a~0:52+0:11, m~0:49+0:07,
C~0:947+0:009 for the non spatial treatment.
The last model we simulated are the moody conditional
cooperators. The probability of cooperating is given by
PCDC(l)~aCzbCl PCD (l)~aDzbDl ð9Þ
The probability of cooperating after l neighbors cooperated and
the focal player cooperated is PCD (l). If the focal player defected,
the corresponding probability is PCD (l). For the simulations, we
chose the parameters aC~0:20, bC~0:35, aD~0:22, and
bD~{0:08.
Simulations were performed for a spatial and a non spatial
setting. In order to analyze the influence of the size of the lattice,
we simulated lattice size 4|4 and 100|100. Figure 5 shows the
Figure 5. Simulations for different update mechanisms. Top figures are for the spatial structure and the bottom ones are for non spatial
structure. Left to right: unconditional imitation, Fermi and moody conditional cooperators. We see that, for this payoff matrix, the only update
mechanism where the spatial structure is relevant is unconditional imitations without random strategy exploration.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0047718.g005
Experimental Spatial Games
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levels on cooperation in these simulations for the same payoff
matrix as in the experiments, and for the parameters obtained
from the fit to the experimental data. As previously well
established [10], unconditional imitation without exploration will
promote cooperation in the presence of spatial population
structure, but not in non spatial settings. But the promotion of
cooperation will take place only if there is essentially no random
strategy exploration in the system. The presence of noise in the
strategy updating will also destroy the clusters of cooperators.
Thus, the level of cooperation will be equal to the strategy
exploration both in the spatial and the non spatial setting. On the
other hand, the Fermi rule and the moody conditional cooperators
rule lead to the same levels of cooperation in the spatial and in the
non spatial setting for our choice of parameters. Notice, that this
may change for a different payoff matrix, other parameters or if we
would allow self-interactions. Our results are in good agreement
with the results in [44], where it is shown by simulations that in a
population of cooperators, defectors and moody conditional
cooperators, the structure of the population does not promote or
inhibit cooperation compared to a well mixed population.
Discussion
We have compared a spatial and a non spatial behavioral
experiment with human subjects playing a Prisoner’s Dilemma.
We have found no significant differences between the two
treatments, neither in macroscopic properties such as the level of
cooperation, nor in the way that players update their strategies.
On the one hand, this is good news for theorists, because their
assumption of consistent strategy updates in spatial and non spatial
systems seems to be justified. On the other hand, our results
suggest that the idea that spatial structure promotes cooperation
cannot be carried over to human experiments in a straightforward
way. This result is in line with previous results from other
experiments. Cassar has found that cooperation was hard to reach
on different, albeit small networks [38]. Kirchkamp and Nagel
have performed an experiment on a one dimensional lattice
(circles) as well as in a group setting; their results suggest that naive
imitation may be negligible in such experiments [34]. Suri and
Watts have performed an online experiment and found that
network topology had no significant effect on the level of
cooperation [39].
It could be argued that in the above experiments the
cooperation is not observed because of the small system size, but
in experiments one order of magnitude larger [36] or even two
orders of magnitude larger [37], the level of cooperation changed
over time similarly. However, in those experiments, the same
players were used for both treatments subsequently. Therefore, the
comparison we make here is not straightforward in those
experiments. All these experiments are performed on different
spatial structures with different payoff matrices and system sizes.
Common to them is the observation that a strategy updating that
does not allow the innovation of a new strategy in a neighborhood,
e.g. players switching to defection in a neighbor of cooperators, is
not a good explanation for the data.
It could be argued that the size of our system is not big enough
for spatial structure to make a difference or that the payoff matrix
is not the ideal choice. In principle, it is possible that for a different
payoff matrix or a larger system, significant differences between
the two treatments (spatial and non spatial) would be observed.
Therefore, the similarity of players’ behavior in both settings
should be put to the test in larger systems and for different payoff
matrices, before a final conclusion is made. However, one has to
keep in mind that random strategy exploration is preventing the
formation of clusters. It seems to be unlikely that this feature
disappears for larger lattices or different parameters.
However, our results do not imply that the theoretical analysis
of spatial games is not meaningful. In other biological or
technological systems these considerations may be applicable
directly. Moreover, the effect of spatial structure could be much
more subtle than implied by many theoretical works. In particular,
theoretical work should consider the role of mutations (which may
arise from mixed strategies, strategies that try to anticipate the
future behavior of the neighbors, or from strategies which consider
more than one past interaction), see e.g. [43,45,46], or other, more
sophisticated strategy update mechanisms [47–49], which is only
rarely done in structured populations. However, it is difficult to
imagine strictly spatially structured hunter gatherer society.
In addition, population structure may have played a crucial role
in our evolutionary past and potentially also in our present and
future [50]. It is frequently argued that many features of human
behavior have evolved in hunter gatherer societies. The popula-
tion structure of these societies may thus be crucial for the
evolution of human cooperation.
Most importantly, theoretical considerations of fixed networks
are a necessary first step to analyze dynamical networks, which
may be a more realistic way to address human behavior. Recent
experiments of such dynamical networks indicate that there is
indeed a scope for the evolution of cooperation mediated by
network structure [51,52].
Methods
We used the experimental data from [35]. A detailed
explanation of the experiment can be found there. The data of
this experiment is available upon request. We emphasize that each
player was identified by a letter ranging from a to p (e.g., a has the
following neighbors: b, d, e, and m). Therefore, in the spatial
treatment players could see that their neighbors were always the
same, for example: f, d, e, and a. Subjects were told in the
instructions that their neighbors would stay the same throughout.
On the other hand, in non spatial treatment, players could see that
in each round they have different neighbors. Subjects were told in
the instructions that their neighbors would change after each
round. Consequently, it is highly unlikely that the players
misunderstood their specific rules of the game. In the non spatial
treatment the players had no access to information of the previous
actions of their present neighbors. Thus, they could not react
directly to their previous behavior. In contrast it was very easy in
the spatial setting to memorize the four strategies of their
neighbors for the next encounter.
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